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THE WAGE ELASTICITY OF LABOUR SUPPLY: A SYNTHESIS
OF EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES∗∗∗∗
BY
MICHIEL EVERS∗, RUUD DE MOOIJ∗∗ AND DANIEL VAN VUUREN∗∗∗
Summary
This paper performs a meta-analysis of empirical estimates of uncompensated labour supply
elasticities. For the Netherlands, we find that an elasticity of 0.5 for women and 0.1 for men is a
good reflection of what the literature reveals. The elasticity for men hardly differs between coun-
tries, but for women some cross-country variation is found. The increasing participation rate of
women may lead to a somewhat lower elasticity in the future. Both the specification of the hours
function and the estimation method are found to affect elasticity estimates.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The elasticity of labour supply with respect to the wage rate1 plays a critical
role in many economic policy analyses. For example, its value determines to
a large extent the employment impact of reforms in redistributive tax-benefit
systems (see e.g. Graafland et al. (2001)). Moreover, it is crucial for the mag-
nitude of the efficiency cost of income taxation in general equilibrium models
(see e.g. Ballard et al. (1985); Browning (1987)). Indeed, the larger is the elas-
ticity of labour supply, the larger is the employment effect in response to a
change in the tax rate and the higher is the excess burden of taxation.
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1 The uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply is defined as the percentage change in
hours worked as a result of a one percent change in the net hourly wage rate.
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In light of its importance, a large number of studies have estimated the
uncompensated elasticity of labour supply. The results of this literature are
reviewed in e.g. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). It appears that there exists
great variation in study results and an equally large variation in approaches
to estimate the elasticity. As a result, there is little agreement among econo-
mists on the magnitude of the elasticity that should be used in economic pol-
icy analyses. To illustrate, Prescott (2004) explains the difference in hours per
worker between the US and Europe entirely by the differences in redistrib-
utive tax-benefit schemes between the two continents. Alesina et al. (2005),
however, maintain that this story would require an unrealistically large value
of the uncompensated elasticity of labour supply.
Some studies have tried to explain the wide dispersion in empirical esti-
mates of the uncompensated labour supply elasticity in the literature. A typ-
ical finding is that the elasticity for women exceeds that for men. Another
is that the elasticity regarding the decision to participate (the extensive mar-
gin) exceeds the elasticity of the decision regarding hours worked (the inten-
sive margin). This latter result may also explain the relatively large elasticity
for women, as the participation rate among women is typically lower than for
men. The rising participation rate among women in recent decades may have
led to a decline in the elasticity of labour supply of women, as is for instance
found by Blau and Kahn (2007).
Other study characteristics that can explain the variation in research
findings have been explored by Mroz (1987). He examines the effects of
economic and statistical assumptions on outcomes for married women. His
findings suggest that specification and exogeneity assumptions have a substan-
tial impact on the estimated elasticities. MaCurdy et al. (1990) explore the
impact of implied model restrictions on parameter estimates in the context
of maximum likelihood estimation of structural labour supply models. Their
outcome is similar to Mroz’. Ericson and Flood (1997) conclude that differ-
ent estimation strategies may lead to quite some dispersion between estimates,
in particular when measurement error is present. Ecklo¨f and Sackle´n (2000)
show that the construction of variables from raw data may play an impor-
tant role as well. They attribute the difference between the findings of Haus-
man (1981) and MaCurdy et al. (1990) precisely to this. Thus, it is found
that the method, data, specification or estimation technique have a potentially
large impact on the estimates of the model parameters, and in the end, on the
(most often implicitly) estimated labour supply elasticity.
Our paper contributes to this literature by analyzing the systematic impacts
of the various factors on the reported empirical estimates simultaneously. In
particular, we use a sample of 209 uncompensated labour supply elasticities
obtained from the literature to perform a meta analysis, i.e. we regress the
elasticities on the underlying study characteristics. Apart from gender, par-
ticipation, estimation method and model specification, we also explore the
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impact of a number of other study characteristics and control variables used
in the empirical studies. Moreover, we explore whether there are systematic
differences between countries.
A second contribution of our paper is to obtain a synthesis of research
results. In particular, the careful attention that is usually paid to consistent
estimation of parameters in a properly defined (but not over-specified) model
comes along with limited applicability of the resulting estimates for policy
analysis. For instance, reduced-form estimates resulting from natural experi-
ments are often of little use in the ex ante evaluation of new policy reforms.
Our analysis aims to contribute to the synthesis of research results and, thus,
on the size of the elasticities to be used in economic policy analysis.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief
description of issues in the empirical literature on labour supply elasticities. In
section 3 we discuss the sample of elasticities used. In section 4 we discuss our
strategy to estimate what causes the differences between elasticity estimates,
and discuss estimation results. In this section we also produce point estimates
for male and female labour supply elasticities for a selection of countries, and
we perform some statistical tests. Section 5 concludes.
2 THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON LABOUR SUPPLY ELASTICITIES
It appears from the literature that the estimation of the elasticity of labour
supply with respect to the real after-tax wage rate is not a straightforward
exercise, due to e.g. nonlinear budget constraints, unobserved wages for non-
workers, and various econometric and specification issues. The many ways to
deal with these problems are briefly discussed in more or less chronological
order in this section. The review contains a number of seminal articles, but is
certainly not meant to be exhaustive. For more complete surveys on the topic
we refer to Pencavel (1986); Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) and Blundell
and MaCurdy (1999).
The first empirical effort known to estimate labour supply elasticities was
made by Douglas (1934) in his ‘Theory of Wages’. He used aggregated data
with age-sex groups for 38 US cities, collected from the 1920 Census of man-
ufactures and examined both time series and cross-section data on hours of
work and hourly earnings. Douglas found an elasticity that “is in all prob-
ability somewhere between −0.1 and −0.2”. Modern labour supply studies
often separate the income and substitution effects and make use of micro data
instead of aggregate data. The first studies that make the distinction between
income and substitution effects are Mincer (1963) and Kosters (1966).
Estimating the elasticity of labour supply under the presence of progres-
sive taxes is not straightforward, because a linear model would not ade-
quately represent the essential nonlinearities in the labour supply decision of
individuals (for a comprehensive survey, see Moffitt (1990)). To deal with this,
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Hall (1973) assumes that an individual will behave the same whether he faces
the real budget constraint or a linear extension of the segment he is actu-
ally located on. A problem with this approach (as well as with a naive lin-
ear model) is that the individual’s segment, and consequently his wage rate,
is self-chosen and not exogenous with respect to hours worked. The conse-
quences of this endogeneity in the regressors are investigated extensively in
Mroz (1987) and, more recently, discussed in Heim and Meyer (2003). As an
alternative, the instrumental variable (IV) approach offers a robust and still
relatively straightforward way to obtain a consistent estimate of the uncom-
pensated labour supply elasticity. A major problem of IV-estimation is, how-
ever, to find instruments that both satisfy the exclusion restriction and yet
show ‘enough’ correlation with the endogenous regressor. For the net wage
rate, gross wages are often used as an instrument. Studies that use both
OLS and four are Mroz (1987); Blomquist (1996); Pencavel (2002); Eissa and
Hoynes (2004) and Blau and Kahn (2005).
An important problem with OLS is endogenous selection. As is known,
selection on endogenous factors, such as the level of income or being employed,
biases the results of simple linear regression techniques. If wages are observed
for all individuals, then the Tobit and two step Heckman method can take
into account that only individuals with a positive amount of hours worked are
observed. An important difference between the two models is that the latter
approach allows for two different sets of regressors to estimate the participa-
tion and labour supply decision. A complication arises when wages are not
observed for non-workers. However, the probability that an individual does
not work can be estimated in a binomial model and applied in the well-known
Heckman (1979) model to correct for endogenous selection. To compute wages
for non-workers an often used approach is to estimate the observed wages for
workers with basic regression techniques on the individual characteristics and
the Mill’s ratio based on the estimated participation probability. While these
characteristics are also observed for non-workers, wages can be imputed for
non-workers by using the estimated coefficients of the regression. Studies that
explicitly take into account selection are Cogan (1981); Mroz (1987); Arellano
and Meghir (1992); Blundell et al. (1998) and Devereux (2004). Mroz explicitly
tests for different selection models and rejects the Tobit model for more general
models that allow different specifications for participation and labour supply.
Burtless and Hausman (1978) explicitly take into account the differently
sloped segments of the kinked budget curve by linking the choice of segment
to the indirect utility function. This method is frequently used in labour supply
studies in the 1980s and 1990s, such as Hausman (1980, 1981); Blomquist
(1983); Hausman and Ruud (1984); Arrufat and Zabalza (1986); Blomquist
and Hansson-Brusewitz (1990); Bourguignon and Magnac (1990); Colombino
and del Boca (1990); Triest (1990); van Soest et al. (1990); Flood and MaCurdy
(1992); Kuismanen (1997) and Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998).
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MaCurdy et al. (1990) criticise the Hausman method for imposing too
strong a priori restrictions on the outcomes. As an alternative, the authors
propose a method with a twice differentiable convex budget constraint. The
specification of the model is however more cumbersome, and the model is
hardly used in empirical studies. Apart from the original article, a second
application is Flood and MaCurdy (1992). As would be expected when the
differentiable budget curve is a good approximation of the kinked budget
curve, the results do not differ much from those obtained with the ‘original
Hausman method’.
The standard model of labour supply does not distinguish between the
effect of wages and taxes on the decision to participate (the extensive mar-
gin) and the decision regarding hours worked (intensive margin). Yet, work-
ers rarely choose a small number of hours. Perhaps fixed costs of entering
the labour market, such as child care or transport costs, or institutional fac-
tors such as the tax system are relevant. Supply restrictions may also play a
role. Mroz (1987) indeed finds evidence that the labour supply behaviour at
the extensive margin differs from the behaviour at the intensive margin. The
author finds that, when this effect is neglected, the estimated wage elastic-
ity is biased upwards, because hours of work conditional on participation are
relatively inelastic with respect to the net wage, while the participation deci-
sion is quite elastic with respect to the net wage. A way to model the decision
to participate is to include fixed time or fixed money costs of entering the
labour market. The latter can be introduced as a reduction in non-labour
income if the number of hours worked is positive, so that individuals will
then only supply labour above a minimum number of hours. Bourguignon
and Magnac (1990) estimate a model for women that includes fixed costs and
find that the uncompensated labour supply elasticity is reduced from 0.96 to
0.39. Cogan (1981) finds that the uncompensated labour supply elasticity falls
from 2.45 to 0.88 after correcting for entry costs.
An alternative approach is to estimate a participation equation first and
then estimate the supply function conditional on the predicted participation.
van Soest (1995) includes dummy variables for certain discrete hours choices
less than full time and finds a negative effect on the estimated wage coeffi-
cients. The main drawback is that the restrictions are assumed to be homoge-
neous across individuals. Recently, discrete choice models have become more
popular for estimating labour supply elasticities. The advantage of models
with discrete choice is that it is not necessary to define the entire budget con-
straint. Discrete choice models assume that individuals choose from a finite
set of hours of work, so that only a limited number of choices need to be
evaluated. Moreover, the restrictions in the Hausman model do not need to
be imposed. Studies that use this approach are, amongst others, van Soest
(1995); Euwals and van Soest (1999); Euwals (2001); Bonin et al. (2002) and
Bargain (2005).
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Recent studies often make use of policy reforms. The preferred case is to
compare two randomly selected groups before and after the introduction of
a policy change. One group should have experienced the change (the treated)
and the other should not (the controls). This approach gives unbiased esti-
mates if time effects are common across the two groups, and endogenous
switching between groups is not allowed.2 An important question is whether
the estimators measure behavioural responses. When no structural specifica-
tion is used, income and substitution effects and intertemporal and within-
period effects are easily mixed up. An example of a study making use of a
‘policy reform’ is Saez (2003), who uses the fact that an individual pays a
higher marginal tax rate if his wage increases with the inflation rate, while the
income tax brackets are fixed nominally. Contrary to other studies that use
tax reforms, this enables him to separately estimate the income and substitu-
tion effects.
3 CONSTRUCTING A SAMPLE OF LABOUR SUPPLY ELASTICITIES
In this section we construct a data set of empirical estimates of the uncom-
pensated labour supply elasticity. Our focus on the uncompensated labour
supply elasticity is governed by the availability of research findings. In
particular, many studies do not report separate values for the compensated
elasticity and the income elasticity of labour supply. Even for the uncompen-
sated elasticity, it is not always possible to derive its implicitly estimated value
from the presented research findings. Thus, we only select studies which either
explicitly or implicitly report one or more estimates. It is however emphasised
that the selected sample of elasticities is by no means exhaustive. Our search
has primarily focussed on highly reputed academic journals and recent work-
ing papers, but was not able to include all the literature on labour supply.
Not all studies report explicit estimates of the uncompensated elasticity.
Still, it is often possible to construct a consistent estimate from reported point
estimates of marginal coefficients using sample statistics of hours worked and
the wage rate. In particular, denote hours worked by h,w the wage rate, Y
non-labour income, x a vector of control variables, and β a parameter vec-
tor of the same dimension as x. Then the hours function and the uncompen-
sated labour supply elasticity for an individual with characteristics w, Y , and
x reads as follows:
h=φ(w,Y, x|β)⇒ e := ∂ lnh
∂ lnw
= w
h
φw(w,Y, x|β), (3.1)
2 Of course, non-generic time effects and endogenous switching can be allowed if the econo-
metrician is capable of correcting for these.
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where φw is the derivative of the hours function φ with respect to the wage
rate w. After substituting sample means for w, h, Y and x, a consistent esti-
mator of the elasticity e at the sample mean is obtained (i.e. for an imaginary
individual whose characteristics precisely match the sample mean).
In constructing a sample of elasticities, a number of studies cannot be
used. In particular, many studies based on tax reforms do not report uncom-
pensated labour supply elasticities nor the required information to compute
this figure (cf. (3.1)). Hence, these studies could not be used in our sam-
ple. Also, we have excluded estimates obtained from OLS estimation, for
these are known to be inconsistent (see section 2). Ultimately, our literature
search yields a sample of 209 elasticities obtained from 30 different stud-
ies. Tables 1 and 2 present some summary indicators for the sub-samples of
men and women, respectively. We see that the mean elasticity for men equals
0.07, whereas for women it equals 0.43. Mean elasticities per study for men
range between −0.08 and 0.18. For women, the table shows great varia-
tion across different studies: mean elasticities range from 0.03 to 2.79. If we
leave out four outlier observations – which are defined as observations
which differ more than two standard deviations from the sample mean
– then the mean elasticity for women equals 0.34. The number of elasticities
per study varies from one (various studies) to 23 (Mroz (1987)). The last
column in both tables shows that although most estimates of the elasticities
are significantly different from zero at a five percent significance level, a num-
ber is not significant or no information was supplied by the authors.
Figures 1 and 2 show empirical distributions for the sub-samples of men
and women, respectively. The dashed lines correspond with the borders of the
interval with twice the standard deviation around the mean. In Figure 2, the
left border of the interval is smaller than the minimum value and therefore,
not shown in the figure. Clearly, the variation in point estimates for men is
much smaller than that for women. It also appears that the distribution for
women is more skewed to the right. Median values of elasticities for men and
women are indicated by the solid lines. For women, a substantially higher
value than for men is found (0.27 and 0.08, respectively).
4 ESTIMATION
In this section we aim to identify the factors which systematically impact
the magnitudes of elasticity estimates. We do this by running meta
regressions of a set of so-called ‘moderator variables’ on the empirical wage
elasticity of labour supply. In particular, we run regressions of the following
form:
e= c+Xβ +η (3.2)
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Figure 1 – Distribution of elasticities for men. Note: The solid line indicates the median of the
empirical distribution, and the dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval around the mean
of the distribution
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Figure 2 – Distribution of elasticities for women. Note: The solid line indicates the median of
the empirical distribution, and the dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval around the
mean of the distribution. The lower border of the confidence interval is smaller than the smallest
value on the horizontal axis (−0.7), and is thus not shown in the figure
where e is the uncompensated wage elasticity, c is a constant and X is a
matrix of moderator variables (see below). Study characteristics are assumed
to affect the elasticity in a linear way, with slope parameters in the vector
β. The error term η is assumed to be asymptotically normally distributed,
independently so across different observations.3 An OLS estimator with White
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors will be used, as e.g. in De Mooij
3 It should noted that some elasticities are estimated from the same data sets, and therefore,
error terms may be correlated. This argument is of limited importance for our main findings as
the included empirical studies are based on many different data sources. Yet, it means that the
reported standard errors may be somewhat underestimated.
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and Ederveen (2003). Although weighting the observations may improve the
efficiency of the estimates, it is unclear which weights should be used, and
the interpretation of the effects may become more difficult (Keets and Roberts
2005). We will therefore, not put weights on the different point estimates of e.
We now turn to a brief discussion of the variables included in the mod-
erator matrix X. The first set of variables included in the regression consists
of country dummy variables. These dummy variables may reflect differences
in institutional contexts in the different countries or cultural preferences. For
France, Finland, Germany and Italy, the number of observations and stud-
ies included is too small to draw conclusions about country effects. For each
of the latter three countries only one study is available in the data set (these
are, respectively: Kuismanen (1997); Bonin et al. (2002); Colombino and del
Boca (1990)). The second set of variables concerns the estimation technique
used. Older studies mainly use 2SLS (Two Stage Least Squares), while more
recent studies use more complex methods such as Maximum Likelihood. Two
studies apply a non-parametric method (van Soest et al. (2002); Blomquist
and Newey (2002)). The third set of variables indicates the specification that
is used for the labour supply function. The different specifications imply dif-
ferent assumptions about the relationship between the elasticity, the wage rate
and hours supplied on the labour market.
Other variables concern characteristics of the data used to estimate e, such
as gender, household situation, and participation rate. Marital status may
change the labour supply decision compared to the decision by single persons.
Partners may, for instance, jointly decide on their (total) labour supply. It
should be noted that only twelve observations (from two studies) for unmar-
ried individuals were collected. The study of Euwals (2001) uses a mixed sam-
ple of both married and unmarried women, and has a separate dummy vari-
able. Finally, the sample participation rate is included in order to control for
the fraction of individuals who are at their extensive or intensive margins,
respectively. It has been largely perceived in the literature that the decision at
the extensive margin is likely to be more elastic than the decision at the inten-
sive margin. Hence, failing to control for this variable may lead to a loss in
efficiency or even biased parameters in case the sample participation rate is
correlated with other moderator variables.
Estimation of equation (3.2) for men and women separately gives results
displayed in Table 3. The coefficients should be interpreted as deviations from
a benchmark set of study characteristics. As a benchmark, we take a study
which estimates a semi-log specification for the hours function on a sample of
married US residents by maximum likelihood. The estimation reported in the
last column has omitted four observations from the meta sample which are
more than two standard deviations away from the mean. In comparison with
the other estimation for women, it can be seen that the omission of outliers
implies much smaller standard errors, but that most coefficient point estimates
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TABLE 3 – ESTIMATION RESULTS
Men Women Women, no outliers
Finland −0.27 (0.22) −0.03 (0.11)
France 0.09 (0.03) −0.29 (0.19) −0.16 (0.16)
Germany −0.51 (0.27) −0.64 (0.22) −0.46 (0.14)
Italy 0.10 (0.03) 2.12 (0.11)
Netherlands 0.06 (0.06) −0.26 (0.15) −0.14 (0.12)
Sweden 0.15 (0.04) 0.01 (0.17) 0.05 (0.16)
United Kingdom 0.24 (0.14) 0.13 (0.09)
Non-parametric estimation 0.26 (0.10) 0.65 (0.16) 0.73 (0.15)
2SLS estimation −0.11 (0.05) −0.20 (0.22) 0.10 (0.10)
Simulation −0.42 (0.10) 0.32 (0.30) 0.40 (0.15)
Linear specification −0.10 (0.04) 0.21 (0.22) 0.43 (0.12)
Quadratic specification −0.11 (0.04) 0.51 (0.28) 0.69 (0.18)
Unmarried −0.01 (0.04) −0.16 (0.16) −0.08 (0.15)
Unmarried and married 0.08 (0.26) 0.21 (0.16)
Participation rate −2.20 (0.93) −0.26 (0.21) −0.14 (0.20)
Constant 2.29 (0.92) 0.56 (0.27) 0.20 (0.14)
R-squared 0.38 0.36 0.42
Observations 107 102 98
Standard errors between parentheses (White heteroskedasticity-consistent).
Benchmark for dummy variables: US, Maximum Likelihood, Semi log-specification,
Married.
remain qualitatively the same. Note that we cannot identify a separate coun-
try coefficient for Italy when the outliers are omitted.
Table 3 shows that elasticities for Germany appear to be systematically
smaller than elasticities for other countries. This holds both for men and for
women. For men, elasticities in France, Italy, and Sweden appear to be some-
what higher than in the Netherlands and the US. However, the sample only
includes one single observation per country for France, Germany, and Italy,
so that we should be careful drawing conclusions on these country specific
effects. It is nevertheless remarkable that the Swedish elasticity for men looks
systematically higher than that in other countries.
Further, we find no evidence that maximum likelihood (ML) estima-
tion generates relatively high elasticity estimates, as was suggested earlier by
MaCurdy et al. (1990).4 Instead, ML estimates appear to be structurally
4 MaCurdy et al. (1990) claimed that the high elasticities found in articles using the Haus-
man model (estimated with Maximum Likelihood) are a result of the strong restrictions
imposed in the model. Ecklo¨f and Sackle´n (2000) later played down this claim, and argued
that the findings of MaCurdy et al. (1990) were caused by flaws in their data.
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TABLE 4 – PREDICTED ELASTICITIES
Men Women Women, no outliers
Netherlands 0.12 0.49 0.49
United Kingdom 0.48 0.34
United States −0.01 0.38 0.29
Sweden 0.12 0.62 0.62
lower than non-parametric estimates. Another interesting point from Table 3
is that the specification of the hours equation appears to impact the elasticity
estimates. For men, it is found that a semi-log specification for the hours
function generates higher point estimates for the elasticity than other speci-
fications. For women, the opposite is found.
For men, the sample participation rate has a negative impact on the esti-
mated elasticity, which is consistent with individuals being more elastic at the
extensive margin than at the intensive margin. A negative coefficient is also
found for women, but this is not significantly different from zero. Thus, on
the basis of these estimations we cannot reject the hypothesis that women are
as elastic at the extensive margin as they are at the intensive margin.
The estimated coefficients in Table 3 allow us to predict elasticities for
different countries. In particular, we use the meta regression and then fix
dummy variables at country-specific levels to compute particular elasticities,
thereby holding other variables at their sample means (specification and esti-
mation method). A selection of the elasticities thus obtained is presented in
Table 4. Clearly, predicted elasticities are larger for women than for men in
all countries. For instance, the elasticity for Dutch men equals 0.12 and for
women it equals 0.49. It has been noted in the literature that this difference
may be attributed to the fact that women are relatively more often located
at the extensive margin (i.e. they are not participating in the labour market),
and that the elasticity for women will converge towards the male level as the
female participation rate goes up. In fact, Mroz (1987) concludes that married
women and prime aged males are equally sensitive at the intensive margin.
This is however not supported by our findings. If we impute the male partici-
pation rate into the meta regression for women, then we predict a female elas-
ticity in the Netherlands of 0.44 or 0.47 (depending on which sample is used).
Similar results are found for the other countries (not reported), be it that elas-
ticities for the US are about 0.10 lower than for the Netherlands, while for
Swedish women a higher elasticity is found.
Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity can be problematic in meta
analysis. Indeed, consistency heavily depends on the ability to observe all
relevant factors that determine the elasticity. We will test for the potential
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TABLE 5 – ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE EXTENDED SPECIFICATIONS
Men Women Women, no outliers
Study characteristicsa
Panel data 0.09 (0.06) −0.08 (0.37) 0.35 (0.19)
In refereed journal −0.06 (0.07) −0.72 (0.45) −0.15 (0.22)
Actual-desired-hours −0.10 (0.01) −0.12 (0.15) −0.01 (0.12)
Measurement error −0.01 (0.05) 0.04 (0.23) −0.14 (0.20)
Control variablesa
Child 0.00 (0.05) −1.18 (0.79) −0.79 (0.05)
Child younger than age 6 −0.02 (0.06) 1.15 (0.83) 1.03 (0.22)
Education −0.05 (0.03) −0.27 (0.15) −0.23 (0.15)
Family −0.16 (0.04) −0.53 (0.46) −0.16 (0.33)
Family size 0.02 (0.04) −2.26 (0.85) −1.26 (0.28)
Health 0.00 (0.12)
Age −0.08 (0.04) 0.24 (0.34) 0.55 (0.16)
Age Squared −0.38 (0.35) −0.09 (0.04)
Study effectsb Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.50 0.61 0.69
Observations 107 102 98
Standard errors between parentheses (White heteroskedasticity-consistent).
aBoth ‘study characteristics’ and ‘control variables’ can only take on the values 0 and 1, indicat-
ing whether the study characteristic applies and whether the control variable has been included in
the specification, respectively.
bStudy fixed effects are only included for studies with at least 8 observations. It was not possible
to include fixed effects for studies with less than 8 observations as a result of multicollinearity.
omission of moderator variables. The results of the extended regressions are
presented in Table 5. Note that coefficients for moderator variables reported
in Table 3 are not reported in Table 5.5
The regression includes four dummy variables representing study charac-
teristics. These refer to (i) the effect of using panel data instead of cross
section data, (ii) whether the study has been published in a refereed jour-
nal, (iii) whether desired hours of work are used instead of actual hours of
work and (iv) whether measurement error is explicitly taken into account
for the observed hours of work. Furthermore, we include dummy variables
which indicate whether certain control variables are used. These include age
(-squared), education (-squared), health, and the presence of children. We
include fixed effects per study for studies with at least 8 observations. This
implies that the coefficients reported in Table 5 are predominantly identified
from the ‘within variation’ of studies.
5 The complete results are available upon request.
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Table 5 shows that most study characteristics do not have significant
impact on the elasticity estimates. It is interesting to see that studies published
in refereed journals tend to publish smaller elasticities than others, but this
effect is not statistically significant. Controlling for the family situation and
age significantly affects elasticity estimates, and for women controlling for the
presence of children appears to be important as well.
While Table 5 shows the significance of each moderator variable separately,
Table 6 shows results for redundant variable tests for sets of moderator vari-
ables. It appears that both the study characteristics and control variables listed
in Table 5 are important in estimating labour supply elasticities. Country effects
are important for women, but not statistically significant for men. The speci-
fication of the hours function and the estimation method are statistically sig-
nificant at the 5% confidence level for women, but not for men. In this speci-
fication, the participation effect is not statistically significant anymore, while it
was so in the earlier estimation in Table 3.
Table 7 shows the estimated coefficients for some alternative samples, using
the same model specification as in Table 3. The first and second column are
based on samples that contain only observations from studies published in
refereed journals. Comparing estimation results with those in Table 3, we see
that the main difference is that both the estimation method and the specifi-
cation chosen do not have a significant impact anymore on the estimates for
men. The third and fourth column of Table 7 are based on samples where
observations with identical characteristics are combined. That is, whenever
multiple elasticities were reported within a study for a given country, gen-
der, estimation method, specification, etc., we included just one value, being
the average point estimate. Following this procedure, we reduce the sample to
26 and 28 observations for men and women, respectively. Again, it is found
that both the estimation method and the specification chosen do not have a
significant impact anymore on the estimates for men. The smaller sample size
TABLE 6 – REDUNDANT VARIABLE TESTS
Men Women, no outliers
F-statistic Probability F-statistic Probability
Country 1.7 0.14 10.3 0.00
Estimation 2.6 0.06 7.4 0.00
Specification 2.7 0.07 7.1 0.00
Marital status 25.0 0.00 4.4 0.02
Participation 0.6 0.43 0.1 0.73
Characteristics 28.3 0.00 5.3 0.00
Control variables 73.9 0.00 153.0 0.00
Study effects 0.2 0.89 6.9 0.00
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TABLE 7 – ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR ALTERNATIVE SAMPLES
Published in refereed journal Independent observations
Men Women, no outliers Men Women, no outliers
Finland −0.08 (0.35)
France 0.12 (0.03) −0.12 (0.20) 0.10 (0.03) −0.32 (0.34)
Germany 0.00 (0.73) −0.47 (0.45)
Italy 0.13 (0.03) 0.11 (0.03)
Netherlands 0.27 (0.11) −0.14 (0.12) 0.18 (0.15) −0.08 (0.33)
Sweden 0.12 (0.03) 0.05 (0.16) 0.16 (0.04) −0.23 (0.32)
United Kingdom 0.26 (0.09) 0.17 (0.25)
Non-parametric −0.03 (0.20) 0.73 (0.17) 0.07 (0.30) 0.67 (0.38)
estimation
2SLS estimation −0.01 (0.06) −0.04 (0.08) 0.00 (0.04) −0.10 (0.35)
Simulation −0.01 (0.21) 0.41 (0.18) −0.19 (0.28) 0.29 (0.47)
Linear specification −0.03 (0.07) 0.44 (0.11) −0.02 (0.05) 0.33 (0.33)
Quadratic specification −0.01 (0.07) 0.70 (0.18) −0.03 (0.05) 0.72 (0.40)
Unmarried 0.03 (0.04) −0.08 (0.17) −0.04 (0.07) −0.36 (0.38)
Unmarried and married 0.22 (0.15) 0.06 (0.37)
Participation rate 0.96 (1.82) −0.14 (0.20) −0.53 (2.63) −0.38 (0.42)
Constant −0.97 (1.82) 0.19 (0.14) 0.54 (2.59) 0.52 (0.41)
R-squared 0.39 0.49 0.66 0.54
Observations 78 83 26 28
Standard errors between parentheses (White heteroskedasticity-consistent).
however plays a role in this, resulting in relatively high standard errors. For
women this is even worse, so we cannot draw any strong conclusions.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper reviews empirical findings on the magnitude (and sign) of the
uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply (that is, the percentage
change in hours worked as a result of a one percent change in the net hourly
wage rate). By using meta regressions, we also aim to identify the sources of
variation in the empirical literature.
We develop a meta sample of 209 elasticities drawn from 30 empirical stud-
ies. On the basis of our meta regression, we predict the uncompensated wage
elasticity of labour supply for Dutch women at around 0.5. The correspond-
ing figure for men is predicted at 0.1. Predictions for Sweden, the UK, and
the US are quite similar, although the elasticities in the UK and the US
appear somewhat lower and those in Sweden somewhat higher.
Regarding the variation in study results, earlier studies principally focus
on model specification and estimation techniques and in a partial setting. We
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add to this by exploring a broader set of potential sources of variation and
by performing a simultaneous meta analysis. Our results confirm that both
the model specification and the estimation method impact elasticity estimates.
Controlling for the family situation and age significantly affects estimates of
the labour supply elasticity. For women, controlling for the presence of chil-
dren is also found to affect such estimates. Finally, we find that women have
a larger labour supply elasticity than men, even after taking into account par-
ticipation rates. It is thus suggested that the elasticity at the intensive margin
is more elastic for women than for men.
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